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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SEARCH AND SEiZURE-THE ROLE OF POLICE OFFI-
CER GOOD FAITH IN SUBSTANTIVE FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE-
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
Called to investigate two persons allegedly appearing to be intoxicated,
Detroit police officers encountered respondent Gary DeFillippo and a
young woman in an alley. ' When asked for identification, DeFillippo re-
sponded ambiguously 2 and was arrested 3 for violation of a city "stop-
and-identify" ordinance. The ordinance declared unlawful a refusal by
any person stopped under its authority to identify himself and to verify his
identity.4 DeFillippo was then searched and found to be carrying two
small packages containing marijuana and phencyclidine, both controlled
substances. He was subsequently charged with possesson of phencycli-
dine5 rather than with violation of the stop-and-identify ordinance.
At a preliminary examination, DeFillippo's motion to suppress the evi-
dence obtained in the search incident to his arrest was denied. 6 On interlo-
cutory appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, finding the stop-
and-identify ordinance unconstitutionally vague, and the phencyclidine
therefore the inadmissible product of an illegal arrest and search. 7 The
Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. 8 In a six to three deci-
sion9 on certiorari review, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
1. According to the officers, DeFillippo did not seem to be intoxicated. Brief for the Respondent
at 7, Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31,33 (1979).
2. DeFillippo first stated that he was Sergeant Mash of the Detroit City Police Department, then
changed his answer and said that he either worked for or knew Sergeant Mash. 443 U.S. at 33.
3. Michigan's General Arrest Statute permits an officer to arrest a suspect whom the officer has
probable cause to believe has committed a criminal offense in his presence. MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 764.15 (1970). See section III-B infra.
4. DErRorr, MICH., CODE § 39-1-52.3 (1976), reprinted in Brief for the Respondent at 5-6 n.7.
The ordinance provided:
When a police officer has reasonable cause to believe that the behavior of an individual warrants
further investigation for criminal activity, the officer may stop and question such person. It shall
be unlawful for any person stopped pursuant to this section to refuse to identify himself, and to
produce verifiable documents or other evidence of such identification. In the event that such
person is unable to provide reasonable evidence of his true identity, the police officer may trans-
port him to the nearest precinct in order to ascertain his identity.
5. MICH. Cohip. LAws ANN. § 335.341(4)(b) (1970) (current version at MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 333-
.7401 (1979)).
6. Joint Appendix to Brief for the Petitioner and Brief for the Respondent at 14-15, Michigan v.
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
7. People v. DeFillippo, 80 Mich. App. 197,262 N.W.2d 921 (1977).
8. 402 Mich. 921 (1978).
9. Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion was joined by Justices White, Powell, Blackmun,
Rehnquist, and Stewart. Justice Blackmun also filed a concurring opinion. Justice Brennan dissented
in an opinion joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens.
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state court of appeals. 10 The Court held that because the arrest was based
on probable cause and effected in good faith reliance on a presumptively
valid ordinance, it was lawful despite the later judicial determination that
the ordinance was unconstitutional."I Having validated his arrest, the
Court further held that DeFillippo was legally searched and that the con-
traband evidence should not have been suppressed. 1 2
Chief Justice Burger's brief majority opinion belies the magnitude of
fourth amendment doctrinal issues raised by the case. The Court did not
simply decline to apply the exclusionary rule remedy. Rather, it struck at
the core of fourth amendment privacy rights, for the first time utilizing
police officer good faith reliance to deny the existence of a constitutional
violation. 13
This note challenges the Court's implicit assumption that a policeman's
good faith reliance is relevant in determining whether the fourth amend-
ment has been violated. That assumption is incompatible with pre-
cedent. 14 Prior decisions suggest good faith reliance should not be consid-
ered until after the court has established that a violation occurred and
applicability of the exclusionary rule is at issue. Without offering a coher-
ent explanation for its departure from precedent, the DeFillippo Court
casually added police good faith to the already complex body of substan-
tive search and seizure law. Thus, the decision created yet another dimen-
sion of disquieting uncertainty in the doctrine. 15 Moreover, the Court's
deference to a police officer's good faith reliance on a substantive law
encourages the use of sham substantive offenses to avoid fourth amend-
ment limits. Finally, the Court's emphasis on good faith reliance may
10. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
11. Id. at 40.
12. Id.
13. DeFillippo was thus directly concerned with substantive constitutional rights and only deri-
vatively with the question of remedy. The suppression sanction obviously cannot operate without a
cognizable fourth amendment violation to trigger it.
14. See section I-C infra.
15. Judges and legal commentators have bemoaned the unpredictability and lack of clarity in
fourth amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 771 (1979) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring); United States v. Sutton, 341 F. Supp. 320, 322 (1972) (To "unwind" the Supreme Court's
search and seizure cases "would require the mind of a medieval scholastic .... "); Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974); Burkoff, The Court that De-
voured the Fourth Amendment: The Triumph of an Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine, 58 OR. L.
REv. 151 (1979); Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Law-
yering, 48 IND. L.J. 329 (1973); LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law . . . Has
Not . . . Run Smooth," 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255. For a brief historical survey of the major Supreme
Court cases in the search and seizure area see CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY'S GuIDETOTHE U.S. SUPREME COURT 539-53 (1979).
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misdirect the lower courts, prompting them to substitute the judgments of
those who enact and enforce the laws for the disinterested scrutiny of a
magistrate.
I. BACKGROUND: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE, AND POLICE OFFICER GOOD
FAITH
A. Fourth Amendment Rights
The Supreme Court has long maintained that the thrust of the fourth
amendment' 6 is "to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals
against arbitrary invasions by government." 17 The Court has chosen what
Professor Amsterdam labels an atomistic model: the amendment's funda-
mental purpose is not to control the police in all their confrontations with
the citizenry, but to surround each individual with a sphere of private
interest which may not be penetrated impertinently by the government. 18
As a first principle, then, the amendment is concerned with protecting
personal rights rather than with regulating government generally.
There is an incidental regulatory dimension to the protectionist purpose
16. The cryptic language of the amendment, which has bred enormous controversy, reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
17. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). See also Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25, 27 (1949); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393-94 (1914). This view of the fourth
amendment's purpose emerged clearly in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), where Justice
Bradley, interpreting Lord Camden's famous denunciation of English general warrants in Entick v.
Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1030 (95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765 )), stated:
The principles laid down in [Lord Camden's] opinion affect the very essense of constitutional
liberty and security . . . . They apply to all invasions, on the part of the Govern-
ment . . . of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his
doors and the rummaging of his drawers that constitutes the essense of the offense; but it is the
invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private prop-
erty . . . it is the invasion of this sacred right which underlies and constitutes the essense of
Lord Camden's judgment.
116 U.S. at 630.
18. Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 367-72. Professor Amsterdam's conclusion that an atomistic
model has been adopted is based on the "standing" cases, which allow only those litigants whose
personal privacy or liberty has been violated by the government the opportunity of moving to sup-
press incriminating evidence obtained as a consequence of the illegality. See Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969). See also Yackle, The Burger Court and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 26 KAN. L. REv. 335, 356-58 (1978) (noting that an atomistic concept of the fourth amend-
ment was reflected in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), which held that the protective
cover of the amendment extends only to the individual's legitimate expectations of privacy).
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underlying the amendment. 9 Because it "guarantees to citizens
• . . the absolute right to be free from unreasonable searches and seiz-
ures," 20 the fourth amendment necessarily "operates as a limitation upon
the exercise of federal power." 21 This concept of the amendment's pur-
pose has provided the Court with a convenient, though largely unarticu-
lated, basis upon which to detach the exclusionary rule, the primary
"remedy" 22 available for breaches of the fourth amendment, 23 from the
right to be secure against unreasonably intrusive government searches and
seizures.
B. The Exclusionary Rule Remedy
Sixty-six years ago the Court mandated a rule of exclusion to deprive
government of the benefits of evidence seized in violation of the fourth
amendment. 24 Despite persuasive arguments that the exclusionary rule is
an ingredient of fourth amendment substance25 or, alternatively, "an in-
19. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28-30 (1949). See Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 371:
Burkoff, supra note 15, at 168.
20. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392
(1971).
21. Id. And, by the fourteenth amendment due process clause, it has been extended to limit
unduly intrusive exercises of state power. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See notes 28 & 29
infra.
22. The term "remedy" is used loosely in describing the exclusionary rule, since the rule is not
applied by the Court in the true sense of aiding or compensating the victim of an illegal search or
seizure. Rather, its aim is to deter future violations by punishing the government for exceeding con-
stitutional limits. Since the rule results in suppression of reliable, probative evidence at trial, how-
ever, its application has an inevitable compensatory dimension from the perspective of the criminal
defendant. See generally United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974); Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1961); Coe, The A.L.I. Substantiality Test: A Flexible Approach to the
Exclusionary Sanction, 10 GEORGIA L. REV. 1, 13 (1975); Yackle, supra note 18, at 417. Although
alternatives to the exclusionary rule exist, including civil suits for damages and/or injunctive relief,
and criminal proceedings against offending officers, it is conceded that they are not generally avail-
able. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 415-16
(1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 429-30; Yackle, supra note 18, at
416.
23. For a stern criticism of the Court's analytic separation of right and remedy in fourth amend-
ment jurisprudence, see Burkoff, supra note 15.
24. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Weeks established an exclusionary rule for
federal criminal cases. The rule was later imposed on the states. See note 21 supra.
25. Justice Day's majority opinion in Weeks v. United States strongly implies that the exclusion-
ary rule was viewed at its inception as part and parcel of fourth amendment guarantees. The rule was
justified as vindicating the victim's paramount right of privacy and preventing a further deprivation of
his constitutional rights. 232 U.S. 383, 393, 394, 398 (1914). Justice Brennan has more recently
echoed that contention. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 460 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). See also J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT. A SruDY IN CONSTITU-
TIONAL INTERPRETATION 77-79 (1966); Schrock & Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule
as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REV. 251 (1974); Sunderland, The Exclusionary Rule:
852
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dispensable remedial dimension of the underlying guarantee,' "26 and thus
available to the same extent as the fourth amendment itself,27 the Court
has more recently concluded that the sanction is purely a prophylactic,
judicially conceived rule of evidence. 28 The doctrinal separation of right
and remedy, first utilized in Wolf v. Colorado,29 has allowed the Court to
impose limits on the scope of the exclusionary rule. Time and again the
Court has denied suppression despite finding (or assuming) a violation of
the fourth amendment. 30
The Court has identified deterrence of police misconduct, a regulatory
A Requirement of Constitutional Principle, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 141 (1978); Yarbrough,
The Flexible Exclusionary Rule and the Crime Rate, 6 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (1978).
26. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89
HARV. L. REv. 1, 24 (1975).
27. Id. See also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 360 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Burkoff, supra note 15, at 187; Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85
HARV. L. REv. 1532, 1548-49 (1972); Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1109,
1111-12 (1969).
28. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446-47 (1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
486-88 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). See also People v. Cahan, 44
Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955); Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV.
1027, 1030 (1974); Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 Jun. 215,
215-18 (1978). The Court's position that the exclusionary rule is merely an evidentiary device blinks
at direct language in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), to the effect that the rule is of constitu-
tional origin. The Mapp Court characterized the exclusionary rule as an "essential part of the right to
privacy," id. at 656, and an "essential ingredient" of the fourth amendment, id. at 657, in holding
that "evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same
authority, inadmissible in a state court" through the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 655. While Mapp
continues as authority for extending the exclusionary rule to the states, the current Court refuses to
acknowledge the Mapp rationale for that extension. Accepting, arguendo, the Court's contention that
the exclusionary rule is non-constitutional in origin and character, it is highly debatable whether the
Court has authority to impose the rule on the states. The Court's authority to establish non-constitu-
tional standards within the federal system probably rests in its supervisory power over the lower
federal courts, see, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 26, but this would not validate the imposition of such
standards on the state courts. Stripped of a constitutional foundation, Mapp and its progeny may
constitute an extrajurisdictional intrusion upon state judicial autonomy, leaving the Court without
legitimate authority to compel state compliance with the exclusionary rule. Yarbrough, supra note
25, at 18. See generally Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 COLuM. L. REv. 181
(1969); Note, The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1656 (1963).
29. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). It appears that Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Wolf majority, drew
the distinction exclusively to combat the incorporationist argument of Justices Rutledge, Murphy,
and Douglas, in dissent, that the exclusionary rule is a constitutional requisite which, like the body of
the fourth amendment, is enforceable against the states within fourteenth amendment due process.
Justice Frankfurter reasoned that the exclusionary rule, as one of many potential alternatives available
to safeguard the fundamental right of security against arbitrary government intrusions, is not insepar-
ably linked with that right. Although Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), adopted the incorporation-
ist argument of the Wolf dissenters, see notes 21 & 28 supra, the Court has since resurrected the Wolf
majority's position without overruling Mapp. See notes 25 & 28 and accompanying text supra.
30. See, e.g., United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979); United States v. Ceccolini, 435
U.S. 268 (1978); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976);
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
853
Washington Law Review Vol. 55:849. 1980
purpose related to but not coextensive with the primary thrust of the
fourth amendment, as the paramount rationale underlying the exclusion-
ary rule. 3 1 The Court operates, then, from a dual premise: (1) the
exclusionary rule originates in the Court's discretionary rulemaking au-
thority rather than in the Constitution; and, (2) the rule is designed to
regulate government by discouraging police misdeeds. 32 Viewed in this
way, the rule is amenable to ongoing reassessment, manipulation, and
even abrogation in the Court's judgment. It is a limited remedy for offi-
cial misconduct, 33 separate from the victim's fourth amendment right.
31. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 445-47 (1976); United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974); Comment, Criminal Procedure: Search and Seizure, 1977 ANN. SUR-
VEY AM. L. 111. But see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,534 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 355 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). An additional rationale-
preserving judicial integrity-was first articulated by Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 483-85 (1928). Justice Brandeis contended that the probity of the
judiciary is irreparably tarnished when the government is permitted to use illegally seized evidence in
a court of law. Id. See also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960). While the judicial
integrity rationale is still mentioned by the Court, it receives only nominal consideration. See, e.g.,
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 464,485 (1976); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531,537-40 (1975).
32. The Court has frequently referred to the exclusionary rule as though it were only a tool of
specific deterrence for inhibiting individual police officers and particular episodes of police miscon-
duct. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 448 (1976); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531,
538-39 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974) (fifth amendment context). See also
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 420-22 (1977) (Burger, C. J., dissenting); Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 416-18 (1971) (Burger, C. J.,
dissenting). As Professor Amsterdam notes, many of the empirical studies of the exclusionary rule
and its deterrent value also seem to have assumed that the rule is supposed to deter only the particular
offending officer. Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 476 n.600. See, e.g., Oaks, Studying the Exclusion-
ary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 720-57 (1970); Spiotto, Search and Seiz-
ure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL SruD. 243 (1973).
In a relatively recent decision, however, the Court, per Justice Powell, stated that the principal
deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule is "over the long term ... to encourage those who formu-
late law enforcement policies, and the officers who implement them, to incorporate Fourth Amend-
ment ideals into their value system." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976). Leading commen-
tators also have identified overall law enforcement policy as a primary target of the exclusionary rule.
Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 431-32; Israel, Criminal Procedure, The Burger Court, and the Leg-
acy of the Warren Court, 75 MIcH. L. REV. 1320, 1412-13 (1977); Yackle, supra note 18, at 426.
Some proponents of the exclusionary rule insist that deterrence of lawmaking bodies is within the
purview of the rule, given the legislative role in shaping law enforcement policy. See United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. at 557, 558 n. 18 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Stone v. Powell, 507 F.2d 93, 98
(9th Cir. 1974), rev'don other grounds, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
Despite convincing arguments for an expansive interpretation of the exclusionary rule's deterrent
purpose, the Court, in practice, has taken an increasingly narrow view of its scope. See notes 29 & 30
and accompanying text supra. In particular, an emphasis on highly individualized marginal deter-
rence variables-such as the good faith of specific police officers-in the exclusionary rule balancing
process, casts doubt on the Court's allegiance to any general policy-directing role for the sanction.
See notes 38-48 and accompanying text infra. The Court apparently is not committed to its broad
statement of exclusionary rule purpose in Stone v. Powell.
33. The Court adheres to a deterrence-oriented justification notwithstanding unresolved empiri-
cal and philosophical controversy regarding the actual deterrent efficacy of exclusion. In United
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The conclusion flows axiomatically that the rule should be applied selec-
tively according to its perceived capability to deter. 34
To assess the applicability of the exclusionary rule in a given context,
the Court balances the anticipated deterrent value against the substantial
social cost exacted by suppression of probative evidence. 35 The cost vari-
ables are recurrent and for the most part uncontroverted. 36 The marginal
deterrence variables are heavily fact-dependent, since any factual condi-
tion which could make deterrence more or less likely might conceivably
influence the Court's evaluation. 37 For example, Justice Powell, concur-
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), the Court evaluated a variety of empirical studies designed to
quantify the impact of exclusion on police misconduct and concluded that each study was flawed and
that none established "with any assurance whether the rule has a deterrent effect even in the situa-
tions in which it is now applied." Id. at 450 n.22. Studies suggesting that the exclusionary rule fails
to effectively deter illegal searches and seizures include Oaks, supra note 29; S. SCHLESINGER,
EXCLUSIONARY INjusTncE: THE PROBLEM OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE, 50-60 (1977); Spiotto, supra
note 32. Other more recent studies appear to establish a deterrent effect on at least some types of law
enforcement conduct. Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data and a
Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 Ky. L.J. 681 (1974); Canon, Testing the Effectiveness of
Civil Liberties Policies at the State and Federal Levels, 5 AM. POL. Q. 57 (1977); Kamisar, Does the
Exclusionary Rule Affect Police Behavior?, 62 JUD. 70 (1978). The best that can probably be said of
the total data compiled to date is that they are inconclusive. Accord, W. LAFAVE, 1 SEARCH AND
SEzrEm: A TRE msE ON THE FouRTH AMENDMENT 26 (1978).
34. Justice Rehnquist reiterated in United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975), that the
exclusionary rule is a "judicially created remedy . . . rather than a personal constitutional right"
and therefore selectively applicable according to its remedial function. Id. at 538-39 (quoting United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)) (emphasis added).
35. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 448-54 (1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
486-89 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348-52 (1974). See Yarbrough, supra note
25, at 19. Although the balancing formula was finally established as the definitive test for applicabil-
ity of the exclusionary rule in the Calandra-Janis-Stone trilogy, its conceptual genesis can be traced
to earlier decisions. See Comment, Fourth Amendment in the Balance-The Exclusionary Rule after
Stone v. Powell, 28 BAYLOR L. REv. 611 (1976); Irons, The Burger Court: Discord in Search and
Seizure, 8 U. RICH. L. REv. 433 (1974).
36. In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Court summarized the main costs of applying
the exclusionary rule. First, it diverts the attention of the litigants and other participants from the
central question of guilt or innocence to collateral issues. Id. at 489-90. Second, it denies the trier of
fact access to reliable, probative, and usually critical evidence. Id. at 490. The truthfinding process is
thus inhibited with the result that the guilty are sometimes permitted to go free. Id. Finally, the
indiscriminate application of the rule may generate disrespect for the law because of its harsh effect.
Id. at 490-91. Each of these cost elements is a by-product of the overriding interest in promoting
effective law enforcement by facilitating the ascertainment of truth. See, e.g., Irvine v. California,
347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954); People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926); 8 WIGMOREON
EVIDEN cE § 2184a, at 51-52 (McNaughton ed. 1961); Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the
Constable Blunders?, 50 TEX. L. REv. 736 (1972).
37. It has been suggested that the practical effect of the Burger Court's balancing approach has
been a retrenchment to the due process "shocking-the-conscience" standard developed almost three
decades ago in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) and Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128
(1954). Yackle, supra note 118, at 427-37. A fact-oriented, essentially case-by-case balancing for-
mula does resemble the Rochin-Irvine due process approach, particularly when the balancing is
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ring in Brown v. Illinois,38 contended that good faith arrests made in reli-
ance on subsequently invalidated warrants or statutes are " 'technical'
Fourth Amendment violations" 39 which are effectively nondeterrable and
thus do not merit application of the exclusionary rule. 40 While the Court
has not formally acknowledged this as a broad proposition, it has af-
firmed, in a variety of contexts, Justice Powell's assertion that police
good faith is a key variable in the balancing process. 41
C. The Role of Police Officer Good Faith
The doctrinal severing of right and remedy in fourth amendment cases
has led to disparate treatment of police officer good faith in exclusionary
rule analysis and in substantive analysis.
1. Good Faith and the Exclusionary Rule
The Court includes police officer good faith in its exclusionary rule
balancing test on the theory that deterrence is less likely in cases of non-
egregious police behavior. Yet the Court has thus far declined to carry the
argument to its logical extreme and declare that the exclusionary rule is
ineffective and hence unavailable whenever the police have acted reason-
ably and in good faith.42
heavily influenced by the flagrancy, egregiousness, and wilfulness of alleged police misconduct. See
note 40 and accompanying text infra.
38. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
39. Id.at6lO.
40. Justice Powell cited examples of deterrence-related variables in an arrest setting: the exis-
tence or non-existence of probable cause to arrest; the collateral (pretextual) motives of the arresting
officer; the physical circumstances under which the arrest was made; the good faith or wilfulness of
the officer responsible for an alleged violation. Id. at 611. Justice Powell's formulation resembles in
many respects the so-called "substantiality" test for application of the exclusionary rule devised by
the American Law Institute (A.L.I.). MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 290.2(2)-.2(4)
(1975). Prominent in both is the state of mind of law enforcement officers involved in the challenged
conduct. For a thorough explanation of the A.L.I. substantiality test by one of its supporters, see
Coe, supra note 22. Other sources have urged the adoption of a flexible approach approximating the
A.L.I. standard. See, e.g., Sunderland, supra note 25, at 154-59; Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 419, 424-26 (197 1)(opinion and appendix of
Burger, C.J., dissenting). But see Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule
and its Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 621, 686-88 (1975).
41. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 279-80 (1978); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S.
128, 135-37 (1978); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 n.28 (1976); United States v. Peltier,
422 U.S. 531 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,447 (1974).
42. Of course, if one accepts the proposition that the exclusionary rule should be applied with an
eye toward discouraging law enforcement policies and legislation mandating unconstitutional con-
duct, see note 28, supra, then the argument for an exception to the exclusionary rule based upon the
good faith of individual police officers loses much of its force. See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMEN T
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United States v. Peltier 3 stimulated speculation that the Court was pre-
pared to ratify a general good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.44
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a five member majority, stated, in dictum,
that if deterrence is the rationale underlying exclusion, then evidence ob-
tained in a search should be suppressed only when the officer knew, or
could properly be charged with knowing, that his conduct violated the
fourth amendment.45 Thus, at least five of the Justices46 have arguably
been poised since Peltier to adopt explicitly a good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule. 47 For the time being, however, good faith reliance re-
mains nothing more than a heavily weighted variable in the overall bal-
ancing formula.48
PRocEnuRE § 290.2(3) (1975) (rendering a fourth amendment violation wilful, and thus substantial
per se, regardless of the officer's actual good faith, if his behavior appears to have been part of the
practice of a law enforcement agency or was authorized by it).
43. 422 U.S. 531 (1975). Peltier, involving the question whether Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266 (1974) should be accorded retroactive application, was decided on the basis of
precedent governing the retroactive application of constitutional holdings. Justice Rehnquist, how-
ever, devoted the bulk of his majority opinion to developing the argument that the deterrent purposes
of the exclusionary rule are not served in cases where the officers involved relied in good faith on a
statute or other external authorization. Id. at 536-42.
44. Justice Brennan, dissenting vigorously in Peltier, predicted that given a "suitable opportu-
nity," the Court would adopt a broad good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Id. at 552. Virtu-
ally every commentator addressing the question in the wake of Peltier reached the same conclusion.
See, e.g., Gilday, The Exclusionary Rule: Down and Almost Out, 4 N. Ky. L. Rav. 1, 7-12 (1977);
Grano, 1976 Annual Survey of Michigan Law-Criminal Procedure, 23 WAYNE L. Rav. 517, 547
(1977); Comment, Impending "Frontal Assault" on the Citadel: The Supreme Court's Readiness to
Modify the Strict Exclusionary Rule of the Fourth Amendment to a Good Faith Standard, 12 TULSA L.
J. 337, 352-56 (1976). The discussion has been roughly divided between proponents and opponents
of a good faith exception. Compare Hyman, In Pursuit of a More Workable Exclusionary Rule: A
Police Officer's Perspective, 10 PAc. L.J. 33, 51-53 (1978) (irreparable shortcoming of a good faith
limitation is that it places a premium on police officer ignorance of constitutional guidelines) and
Kaplan, supra note 28, at 1044 (1974)(same), with Israel, supra note 32, at 1408-15 (reasonable
good faith exception does not imperil the primary deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule) and
Grano, supra, at 551 (when motive is innocent, deterrence is not served).
45. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531,542 (1975).
46. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, White, and Rehnquist,
47. The remaining members of the Peltier majority (the Chief Justice and Justices Blackmun,
Powell, and White) have indicated their support for such an exception in several more recent cases.
See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 156 n.5 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring); Brewer v. Williams,
430 U.S. 387, 413-14 n.2 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 501-02,
537-42 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring and White, J., dissenting); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S.
433,457-58 n.35 (1976).
48. One explanation for the Court's failure to endorse officially a good faith exception despite
majority support is that possibly those Justices who agree in principle that some form of good faith
limitation is needed disagree on what the specific nature of that exception should be. On the issue
whether an objective or a subjective good faith standard is contemplated by the different Justices, see
Comment, 28 BAYLOR L. REv. 611, supra note 35, at 626-28. An alternative explanation may be the
difficulty of squaring a good faith exception with the long line of Supreme Court cases invoking the
exclusionary rule despite undisputed good faith reliance by law enforcement personnel. See notes
58-60 and accompanying text infra.
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2. Good Faith and Substantive Doctrine
In Peltier Justice Rehnquist implied that good faith reliance is relevant
to the suppression issue because of the deterrence purpose that distin-
guishes the exclusionary remedy from the underlying fourth amendment
right.49 Prior to DeFillippo, the Court generally treated police good faith
as an exclusively remedial influence. Good faith was a prominent factor
in deciding whether to apply the exclusionary rule remedy but it played
no discernible role in substantive analysis.
The Court has found fourth amendment violations, in spite of undis-
puted police good faith, where officers acted in reliance on warrants50 or
statutes 51 that failed to satisfy constitutional requirements. According to
the Court, the issue in such cases is whether the challenged conduct can
nevertheless be justified under the fourth amendment. 52 Addressing that
issue, the Court has uniformly disregarded police good faith reliance. 53
The constitutional predicate for a valid arrest or search is objective 54
probable cause, 55 and the responsibility for verifying its existence rests
49. 422 U.S. 531, 538-39 (1975). See notes 34 & 40 and accompanying text supra.
50. See, e.g., Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971) (facially valid arrest warrant later found
fatally deficient); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (search warrant found defi-
cient); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (wiretap order found deficient); Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108 (1964) (search warrant); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958) (arrest
warrant).
51. Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979) (statute authorizing search of all luggage enter-
ing Puerto Rico from the United States); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973)
(statute and supplementing regulations authorizing roving border patrol searches of all automobiles in
the vicinity of the national border); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (state stop-and-frisk
law).
52. See, e.g., Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 567-69 (1971); Sibron v. New York, 392
U.S. 40, 61 (1968).
53. When the issue is the impact on probable cause of a "factual" error, such as a misidentifica-
tion, however, the Court does not hesitate to consider the policeman's good faith. See, e.g., Hill v.
California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971). In Hill, the police mistakenly arrested the wrong party, reasonably
believing him to be the actual suspect for whose arrest probable cause existed. The Court upheld the
validity of the arrest. The rule which emerges is that a reasonable, good faith mistake of fact will not,
in and of itself, vitiate probable cause to arrest or to search.
54. "[I]t is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts
available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in
the belief that the action taken was appropriate?" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,21-22 (1968).
55. Probable cause to arrest means "facts and circumstances within the officer's knowl-
edge . . . sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believ-
ing . . . that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense." Michi-
gan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979). Of course, some searches and seizures, because they are
less intrusive than an arrest or a fullblown search, do not require the traditional level of probable
cause. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1975) (roving border patrol
stop of motorists in the general area of the border for a brief inquiry into their residence status); Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968) (stop and frisk); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538
(1967) (administrative inspection).
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with the judiciary. 56 These cases demonstrate the Court's past unwilling-
ness to allow a policeman's good faith reliance on external authorization
to substitute for probable cause or to compensate for inadequacies in the
probable cause standard. Thus, in discharging its duty to scrutinize the
constitutional validity of police behavior, the Court has treated police of-
ficer good faith as irrelevant. 57
Several of the cases, like DeFillippo, involved police actions con-
ducted without a warrant but pursuant to a specific statutory directive. 58
The Court has unequivocally adopted objective reasonableness of police
conduct, in all the circumstances, as the standard for its substantive fourth
amendment analysis in such cases. 59 Under this standard, a warrantless
search or arrest considered in "the concrete factual context of the individ-
ual case,' '60 is measured directly against the requirements of the fourth
amendment. The question becomes whether the challenged conduct,
standing alone, is "reasonable" within the meaning of that amendment.
Neither the existence of statutory authorization nor the conceded good
faith reliance of the officers involved has had any bearing on the Court's
analysis. DeFillippo seemed to be clearly within the group of cases to
which this standard of substantive review has consistently been applied.
The foregoing discussion illustrates that while police officer good faith
has been a key ingredient of the Court's exclusionary rule balancing anal-
ysis, 61 it has not entered into the analysis of alleged fourth amendment
violations. Until DeFillippo, the Court regarded good faith reliance by
policemen as immaterial in deciding whether an individual's fourth
amendment rights were abridged.
'56. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112-14 (1975). Chief Justice Warren, writing in
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), noted:
The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at some
point the conduct of those-charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more de-
tached, neutral scrutiny of ajudge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or
seizure in light of the particular circumstances.
Id. at 21.
57. The Court has long maintained that the judicial evaluation of probable cause must be based
on external, objective scrutiny: "good faith on the part of the arresting officers is not enough." Henry
v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959), Accord Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 80, 97 (1964); Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949); Director General v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25, 27-28
(1923).
'58. See cases cited in note 51 supra.
59. This, according to the Court, is the appropriate method by which the constitutional reason-
ableness of all warrantless searches and seizures must be tested. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40,
59, 61 (1968).
60. Id. at 59.
61. See notes 39-48 and accompaying text supra.
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II. THE COURT'S REASONING
Chief Justice Burger framed the issue in DeFillippo as "whether an
arrest made in good-faith reliance on an ordinance . . . is valid regard-
less of a subsequent judicial determination of its unconstitutionality. "62
He stated initially that both the arrest and search were valid if the police
had probable cause to believe that DeFillippo had committed a criminal
offense. 63 The Chief Justice then found that, at the time of the arrest, the
officer possessed "abundant probable cause to believe that respondent's
conduct [ambiguously responding to the officer's request for identifica-
tion64] violated the terms of the ordinance." 65 This triggered Michigan's
General Arrest Statute, authorizing the officer to arrest DeFillippo. 66
Therefore the warrantless arrest and the search conducted incident to it67
were upheld and the suppression order was reversed.
According to the Chief Justice, the subsequent invalidation of the ordi-
nance neither impaired probable cause nor in any way affected the le-
gality of the arrest. Since at the time there was "no controlling precedent
that this ordinance was or was not constitutional," 68 the officer relied in
good faith on a "presumptively valid" 69 law and could not be charged
with knowledge of its latent unconstitutionality. 70 To support this conten-
tion the Chief Justice analogized to Pierson v. Ray,71 in which the Court
held that a police officer who relied in good faith on a presumptively valid
law could not be found civilly liable for damages resulting from a depri-
vation of fourth amendment rights .72
62. 443 U.S. at 33.
63. Id. at 35-36.
64. See note 2 supra.
65. 443 U.S. at 36.
66. See note 3 supra. The Supreme Court held in United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976),
that an arrest in a public place without a warrant is valid if it is based on probable cause.
67. A valid custodial arrest, standing alone, entitles the police to conduct a full body search of
the arrestee. Independent probable cause to search is not required. United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973). See also Comment, Reexamination of
the Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine, 56 TEx. L. REv. 1077 (1978); Comment, Searches Incident to
Arrest: The Expanding Exception to the Warrant Requirement, 63 GEO. L.J. 223 (1974).
68. 443U.S. at37.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 37-38. Under that line of reasoning, the ordinance's illegality could not, as a matter of
law, be a "fact or circumstance" within the officer's knowledge in the absence of subjective bad
faith. Alternatively, a law's "presumptive validity" is always a "fact or circumstance" imputed to
the officer's knowledge. See section IV infra.
71. 386 U.S. 547 (1967). Pierson was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
72. 443 U.S. at 38. Chief Justice Burger did not distinguish between the civil and the criminal
setting in his analogy to Pierson. Dissenting, Justice Brennan flatly disputed the majority's focus on
the good faith of arresting officers and in particular challenged its reliance on Pierson as being mis-
placed. Id. at 42 & n. 1. Justice Brennan argued that the civil suit, in which an officer is on trial and is
860
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Finally, Chief Justice Burger distinguished a group of cases in which
the Court struck down good faith searches conducted pursuant to pre-
sumptively valid statutes that "purported to authorize the searches in
question without probable cause and without a valid warrant. ,,73 Those
statutes, he explained, directly sanctioned searches in violation of the
fourth amendment. 74 Detroit's ordinance, by contrast, merely defined a
substantive offense75 and did not empower the police to do anything.
Thus, said the Chief Justice, the only constitutional issue presented in
DeFillippo was whether the officer had probable cause to believe the ordi-
nance had been violated. 76
III. ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM
A. The Court's Choice of Method: Constricting the Right v. Withhold-
ing the Remedy
From DeFillippo's point of view it made little practical difference
whether the Court held, as it did, that no fourth amendment violation oc-
curred or simply that the exclusionary rule was inapplicable. In either
case, the incriminating evidence obtained in the search incident to his
arrest would not be suppressed. Although on that narrow level the alterna-
tive grounds for admitting the evidence are interchangeable, the Court's
choice between them has substantial long-range implications. Limiting
the exclusionary rule may emasculate the right purportedly being pro-
tected,77 but leaves the constitutional substructure undisturbed. A DeFil-
lippo-type decision, on the other hand, erodes the underlying substance
upon which any remedy may operate.
As a general postulate, a remedy-restrictive result is preferable to a
right-destructive result. Two conditions enhance that preference in cases
such as DeFillippo. First, since the outcome is identical under either al-
ternative, the desired result-admissibility of reliable evidence-need not
be achieved at the expense of fourth amendment content. Second, the
exposed to liability, provides a justification for the good faith defense which is absent in the criminal
proceeding, where the suspect is on trial and the police officer is not subject to liability. Id. at 42 n. 1.
See section Il-C infra.
73. 443 U.S. at 39. See the cases cited in note 51 supra, and see notes 58-60 and accompanying
text supra.
74. "Those decisions involved statutes which, by their own terms, authorized searches under
circumstances which did not satisfy the traditional warrant and probable cause requirements of the
Fourth Amendment." 443 U.S. at 39.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 40.
77. Burkoff, supra note 15. See also notes 31-33 and accompanying text supra.
Washington Law Review
flexible fourth amendment remedy doctrine permits withholding the
exclusionary rule in those instances where its deterrence purposes will not
be served, 78 a result made possible by the Court's careful refusal to treat
the remedy as coextensive with the underlying right. 79 It would have been
doctrinally consistent for the DeFillippo Court to reserve good faith-a
major variable in the deterrence-based exclusionary rule balancing pro-
cess 80 -for consideration in that context. The Court, however, read good
faith reliance into the substantive analysis and used it to deny that DeFil-
lippo's fourth amendment rights had been violated.
Nevertheless, exclusionary rule policies influenced the decision. Chief
Justice Burger explicitly mentioned the deterrence rationale of the rule, 81
noting that "no conceivable purpose of deterrence" 82 could be served by
suppression. That reasoning was premature. Deterrence, as a remedial
objective, has no bearing on the existence or non-existence of a fourth
amendment violation. The reference to deterrence in the substantive con-
text indicates a blurring of the doctrinal right-remedy distinction. This is
disturbing because it may expose fourth amendment content to the pres-
sures responsible for steady diminution of the exclusionary rule, 83 allow-
ing Burger Court hostility toward exclusion 84 to taint substantive search
and seizure doctrine.
B. The Incorporation of Good Faith Reliance
The Court's approach also marked a departure from the established
standard for review of warrantless police actions.85 That standard focuses
78. See notes 25-34 and accompanying text supra.
79. See notes 16-34 and accompanying text supra.
80. See note 41 and accompanying text, and section I-C-I supra.
81. 443 U.S. at 38 n.3.
82. Id.
83. But see Burkoff, supra note 15, at 181-88 (taking the position that for the sake of doctrinal
consistency the Court should consolidate its treatment of right and remedy in fourth amendment
cases).
84. The numerous limitations imposed on the exclusionary rule under the marginal deterrence
rationale, see, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), have been widely interpreted as
reflecting the Burger Court's antagonism toward a rule which mandates the suppression of reliable
evidence. Kaplan, supra note 28, at 1040; Yarbrough, supra note 25, at 18; Comment, Reason and
the Fourth Amendment-The Burger Court and the Exclusionary Rule, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 139,
152-58, 166 (1977). Chief Justice Burger has expressed open animosity, referring to the rule as a
"Draconian judicial doctrine," Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 420 (1977)(Burger, C. J., dis-
senting), which is "conceptually sterile and practically ineffective." Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 415 (197 1)(Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 433, 492-93 (1971)(Burger, C.J., dissenting); Burger, Who
Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1964).
85. See notes 58-60 and accompanying text supra.
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on the objective reasonableness of the challenged conduct in all the cir-
cumstances, irrespective of any external authorization for the conduct. 86
The facial validity of the Detroit ordinance, assumed by the Michigan
Court of Appeals to be dispositive, 87 was not the proper issue under pre-
vailing Supreme Court doctrine. 88 Chief Justice Burger appropriately dis-
regarded that question. 89 He erred, however, by looking to the officer's
good faith as a benchmark for the reasonableness of the decision to arrest
86. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40,59 (1968).
87. People v. DeFillippo, 80 Mich. App. 197, 262 N.W.2d 921 (1977). The Michigan Court
adopted the majority view among the lower courts that an arrest made under a law unconstitutionally
vague on its face is invalid regardless of good faith reliance by executing officers. See Newsome v.
Malcolm 492 F.2d 1166 (2d Cir. 1974); Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'don other
grounds, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Hall v. United States, 459 F.2d 831 (D.C. Cir. 1972)(en banc);
People v. Berck, 32 N.Y.2d 567, 300 N.E.2d 411, 347 N.Y.S.2d 33, cert. denied sub nom. New
York v. Berck, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973). Only the Fifth Circuit adhered to the position that the constitu-
tionality of a substantive law is irrelevant in assessing the validity of an arrest for its violation. See
United States v. Carden, 529 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1976).
88. In Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), the Court stated that "[t]he question.., upon
review of a state-approved search or seizure 'is not whether the search (or seizure) was authorized by
state law ... [but] whether the search [or seizure] was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.' "
Id. at 61 (quoting Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61 (1967)). The parties in Sibron had urged that
the main issue was the constitutionality of a state "stop-and-frisk" law. 392 U.S. at 59. The Court,
however, by-passed that question on the theory that the constitutionality of warrantless police con-
duct can be judged only in the factual context of the specific case. Id. at 59-62. Later decisions have
not deviated from the Sibron rule that the facial validity of an underlying law is not the appropriate
issue. See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). While the Court implied in
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 168-71 (1972), that any government action
taken under an unconstitutional law is invalid, that implication has never materialized in fourth
amendment cases. See note 89 infra.
Although the Sibron standard calls for an independent review of warrantless police conduct, its
application can have the indirect effect of invalidating an underlying statute or ordinance. If the chal-
lenged conduct conforms strictly to the terms of an authorizing provision, then finding the conduct
unconstitutional is tantamount to striking down the provision. See, e.g., Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442
U.S. 465 (1979); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U.S. 266 (1973).
89. 443 U.S. at 37, 40. Justice Brennan argued in dissent that it was incumbent upon the Court to
evaluate the constitutionality of the ordinance. Id. at 43-46. The Court's rejection of that argument
negated an implication in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), that arrests as
well as convictions under an unconstitutionally vague law are per se invalid. The Papachristou
Court, per Justice Douglas, ruled that an overbroad vagrancy ordinance is unconstitutional, in part,
because it denigrates the fourth amendment probable cause standard by permitting pretextual va-
grancy arrests of persons suspected of other criminal involvement. Id. at 168-70. Although Papa-
christou dealt with the validity of a vagrancy conviction, the tenor of the opinion suggested that all
official actions under the void law were patently invalid because accomplished without legitimate
authority. The Papachristou rationale was relied upon by the Michigan Court of Appeals. People v.
DeFillippo, 80 Mich. App. 197,262 N.W.2d 921 (1977). See also Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93 (9th
Cir. 1974), rev'don other grounds, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Hall v. United States, 459 F.2d 831 (D.C.
Cir. 1972)(en bane). After DeFillippo, it is clear that a substantive law's constitutionality is not a
precondition to the validity of arrests for its violation.
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and search DeFillippo. The result was a failure to engage in the indepen-
dent evaluation of warrantless conduct mandated by earlier cases.
The DeFillippo majority acknowledged without discussion the offi-
cer's actual good faith, 90 and concluded that since the ordinance was pre-
sumptively valid9' his reliance on it was reasonable as a matter of law.
The inquiry was thus reduced to a rote comparison of its terms (as the
measure of probable cause) with the "facts and circumstances" surround-
ing the arrest. 92 That led to validation of the arrest and search because
DeFillippo's false identification "violated the plain language of the De-
troit ordinance." ' 93 The Court accepted good faith compliance with the
ordinance as a substitute for external judicial evaluation of the officer's
action. Effectively, the Court deferred to the policeman's and the Detroit
Common Council's 94 assessment of what constitutes lawful conduct un-
der the fourth amendment.
Had good faith reliance been reserved for the remedy stage of the anal-
ysis, the Court could not have avoided troublesome constitutional issues
by hiding behind the terms of the city ordinance. Under the traditional
standard for review of warrantless conduct, the Court should have deter-
mined, without reference to the ordinance, whether it was reasonable for
the officer to arrest DeFillippo when and because he failed to identify
himself.95 If the arrest could not have been made in conformity with
90. The Court did not reveal how it ascertained that the officer had in fact acted in good faith. A
criticism of the good faith standard is the added factual burden it imposes on trial courts in fourth
amendment cases. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 560-61 (1975)(Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARV. L. REv. 181, 186 (1979). The good faith inquiry
necessitates probing the mind of the officer involved. Moreover, an officer's assertion of subjective
good faith is virtually impossible for the defendant to refute. Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 436-37;
Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The "Reasonable" Exception to the Exclusionary
Rule, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLoGY 635, 655-56 (1978); Thies, "Good Faith" as a Defense to
Police Deprivations of Individual Rights, 59 MINN. L. REV. 991 (1975). The difficulty of disproving
a good faith claim under these circumstances effectively creates a presumption which redounds to the
benefit of the government in suppression hearings.
91. In DeFillippo, the finding of presumptive validity was based entirely on the non-existence of
"controlling precedent" at the time the arrest occurred. 443 U.S. at 37. The Court stated that in such
cases any law is presumptively valid and may be relied upon by the police, "with the possible excep-
tion of a law so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would
be bound to see its flaws." Id. at 38. The message is manifest: the police may claim reliance upon the
validity of any law except in those extraordinarily rare instances where a clear-cut and binding judi-
cial pronouncement to the contrary has already been made.
92. Id. at 36-37.
93. Id. at 37.
94. The Detroit Common Council is the lawmaking body responsible for the city ordinance.
Brief for the Respondent at 4-5, Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
95. This would have required consideration of at least two issues: (1) whether a suspect stopped
by police on suspicion not amounting to probable cause can be compelled to answer questions during
field interrogation; (2) if so, whether his refusal to answer can independently generate probable cause
to arrest when it had not existed prior to the refusal. These issues were important to the dissenters.
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fourth amendment requirements, then a violation of constitutional rights
occurred regardless of the officer's good faith reliance on an existing law.
Of course, a good faith showing might still have prevented suppression
by blocking application of the exclusionary rule. Nothing precluded a
finding that the arrest was unconstitutional from the suspect's point of
view but valid from the officer's perspective for purposes of resolving the
exclusion issue.
C. The Substantive-Procedural Dichotomy
The Court drew a distinction between substantive laws-like the De-
troit ordinance-which define criminal offenses, and procedural laws
which independently authorize searches and seizures. 96 An arrest or
search carried out pursuant to a procedural law which purports to autho-
rize the conduct without probable cause and without a warrant will be
struck down. 97 An arrest and search conducted under a substantive law
will be upheld if the officer had probable cause and relied in good faith on
the law, even if it is later determined to be unconstitutional. 98 This dis-
tinction is flawed for two reasons.
First, it disregards the inherent procedural dimension of substantive
laws. No criminal statute is operational without an implementing provi-
sion. For example, in DeFillippo, the Michigan General Arrest Statute99
was the procedural arm of the Detroit city ordinance. Technically, the
two laws served distinct purposes. Realistically and functionally, how-
ever, they operated as a unit. In addition, the DeFillippo ordinance was
not a purely substantive law, because it internally and independently au-
thorized the officer to stop and question the defendant. 100 Thus, the initial
intrusion, which led to the subsequent arrest and search, was a direct
product of the ordinance alone. As a general principle, as well as on the
specific law involved, the Court's substantive-procedural distinction is
baseless.
443 U.S. at 44-46. Justice Brennan asserted that the criminal suspect has a clearly defined right to
remain silent in the face of post-stop questioning by police. Aside from dictum in Davis v. Missis-
sippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 n.6 (1969), and Justice White's concurring remarks in Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 34 (1968), both of which take the Brennan position, neither the Court nor any of its members
has addressed the question.
96. 443 U.S. at 39-40. See notes 73-76 and accompanying text supra. The Court has reaffirmed
the distinction in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 96 n. 11 (1979).
97. 443 U.S. at 39-40.
98. Id.
99. MicH. Co p. LAws ANN. § 764.15 (1970).
100. See note 4 and accompanying text supra. The street stop was classified as a "seizure"
within the meaning of the fourth amendment in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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Second, the distinction invites cynical legislatures to circumvent fourth
amendment limitations through the use of superficial substantive of-
fenses. 10' Rather than directly authorize the arrest or search of suspicious
characters-a violation of the fourth amendment-lawmakers will be en-
couraged after DeFillippo to adopt statutes making it a crime for such
individuals not to identify themselves or respond to police questioning. 102
Arrests under these statutes would routinely be followed by pat-downs or
full searches. The Court's artificial line-drawing thus allows an end run
around the fourth amendment. 103 Justice Blackmun suggested, in his con-
curring opinion, that abuses could be avoided by permitting a defendant
to rebut claimed good faith reliance by showing that the police habitually
use the substantive statute as a pretext for conducting otherwise unauthor-
ized searches and seizures. 104 That possibility is unrealistic because it
provides no workable standard to guide the trial courts and because prov-
ing the habitually pretextual application of a statute would be virtually
impossible given the general unavailability of reliable criminal justice sta-
tistics. 105
D. The Analogy to Pierson v. Ray
The majority sought to bolster its position by relying on the reasoning
of Pierson v. Ray.10 6 Pierson and DeFillippo, however, share nothing
beyond some factual similarity. 107 In the civil setting an officer's pecuni-
ary liability is at issue. The appropriateness of an inquiry into the blame-
worthiness of his conduct before requiring him to respond in damages is
101. Justice Brennan argued that the Detroit Common Council was guilty of just such an act of
"legislative legerdemain" in its passage of the ordinance. 443 U.S. at 45. He concluded that the
ordinance was designed to permit the arrest and search of suspicious persons and to avoid constitu-
tional limits on a policeman's authority to compel such persons to answer questions by the "transpar-
ent expedient" of making their refusal to answer a crime. Id.
102. The Detroit ordinance was amended (to make a suspect's refusal to identify himself a crime)
in response to a wave of street crime by juveniles "who consistently refuse to cooperate with the
police in conducting their investigations." Preamble to Ordinance to Amend Chapter 39, Article I of
the Code of the City of Detroit, reprinted in Brief for the Respondent at 5 n.7. The amendment was
part of an "all out 'war' "' against juveniles involved in such crime. Id.
103. Judge Browning, writing for a unanimous three judge panel in Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93
(9th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), described the vagrancy ordinance
under which the defendant had been arrested in that case as one which "though in form ... purports
to create a substantive offense, in effect ... negates the requirement of probable cause, basic to the
Fourth Amendment." Id. at 98. The court invalidated the arrest.
104. 443 U.S. at 40-41 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
105. See INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND SOCIAL RESEARCH, HIGHLIGHTS OF INTERIM FINDINGS AND IM-
PLICATION 8 (1977); The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARV. L. REV. 181, 186 (1979).
106. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
107. Pierson also involved an arrest allegedly made in good faith reliance on a law later held
unconstitutional. Id.
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obvious. To penalize the officer who acts reasonably in the good faith
belief that his behavior accords with a valid law would be unfair and in-
timidating. The civil analogy is simply inapposite in the criminal con-
text' 08 where the defendant's motion to suppress evidence involves no
contest between the officer and the defendant and the officer is not ex-
posed to liability.
Moreover, in Pierson the Court only limited the civil remedy for con-
stitutional deprivations by recognizing a policeman's defense of good
faith reliance. ' 09 It was a remedy-restrictive rather than a right-destructive
holding and had nothing to do with the basic constitutionality of police
conduct. Thus, the DeFillippo Court's indiscriminate analogy to Pierson
as a makeweight for the finding that no fourth amendment violation took
place further obscures the right-remedy distinction.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF DEFILLIPPO
DeFillippo signals the Court's increasing readiness to inquire into the
good faith of arresting or searching officers whenever a defendant seeks
to establish a fourth amendment violation. "10 The decision affords atten-
tive legislatures an excellent opportunity to take advantage of the shift in
doctrine. Recently, the Court declined to apply DeFillippo in a case in-
volving an unconstitutional "procedural" law,"' implicitly reaffirming
its substantive-procedural dichotomy and reinforcing the message that
"substantive" offenses may be used with impunity as a subterfuge for
circumventing constitutional limits.112 Aside from creating this potential
for abuse, the DeFillippo decision seriously undermines the objective
108. See DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 42 n.1 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Stanford
Daily v. Zurcher, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); Mattis
v. Schnarr, 502 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1974). These circuit court cases held that the defense of good faith
is unavailable in civil suits for injunctive relief or declaratory judgment, since it is merely a shield to
protect the public official from having to respond in damages. They fortify the argument that the
Pierson rationale has no place in criminal suppression hearings because in that conext the officer has
no need of a "shield" to defend himself against a damages claim. But see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465,541-42 (1976)(White, J., dissenting)("If the defendant in criminal cases may not recover [dam-
ages] for a mistaken but good-faith invasion of his privacy, it makes even less sense to exclude the
evidence solely on his behalf."); United States v. Dameron, 460 F.2d 294, 295 (5th Cir. 1972);
People v. Gibbs, 16 Cal. App. 3d 761,763, 94 Cal. Rptr. 458, 461 (1971); Weber, Good Faith of
Peace Officers in Search and Seizure: Seeking Proper Limits to the Exclusionary Rule, 53 L. A. BAR
J. 307, 309-15 (1977).
109. 386 U.S. 547,557 (1967).
110. See section II-B supra.
111. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 96 n.11 (1979). The statute in question was ILL. Ray.
STAT. ch.38, § 108-09 (1975), which provided that the officer executing a search warrant may detain
and search anyone on the premises.
112. See notes 101-105 and accompanying text supra.
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standard for judicial review of police-citizen confrontations so important
to the protection of individual privacy rights.
The measure of good faith reliance in DeFillippo purportedly included
both the officer's subjective belief that he was acting lawfully and the
objective reasonableness of that belief. 113 Since virtually every law is pre-
sumptively valid, 114 however, it will be difficult for any court to rule, as a
matter of law, that a police officer's reliance on existing statutory provi-
sions was unreasonable. As a practical matter, then, objective reasonable-
ness is a fictional requirement; the determination of good faith reliance
under DeFillippo hinges on an officer's asserted honesty in fact. '1 5 Given
the difficulty of rebutting such claims, 1 6 the test really boils down to
whether the prosecution can point to a substantive statute or ordinance
that the officer was allegedly enforcing at the time of the challenged con-
duct. If that showing is made, the terms of the law itself serve as the
measure of probable cause. Thus, the effectively subjective good faith
reliance claim becomes the key to the entire analysis, supplanting inde-
pendent judicial scrutiny of police conduct.
On its facts, DeFillippo is limited to situations in which the police offi-
cer's claim of good faith reliance is linked to an objectively verifiable
standard (such as the Detroit ordinance). But the case could prompt courts
to apply a good faith test whenever the adequacy of probable cause to
arrest or to search is an issue. In particular, the majority's ill-advised
analogy to Pierson v. Ray may invite the lower courts to incorporate gen-
113. The objective reasonableness prong of the good faith standard was subsumed within the
finding of presumptive validity. 443 U.S. at 37-38. See note 91 and accompanying text supra.
114. Very few statutes fall outside the Court's encompassing definition of "presumptive valid-
ity." See note 91 supra.
115. This is precisely the subjective inquiry thought to have been foreclosed in substantive fourth
amendment analysis only a year earlier by Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978). In Scott,
Justice Rehnquist stated flatly that an officer's improper motive, while relevant to the exclusion issue,
is not a consideration in establishing the existence or non-existence of a fourth amendment violation.
Id. at 135-37. His rationale, consistent with the Sibron standard, was that the Court's analysis should
be "based on the reasonableness of the actual [conduct]," id. at 134, 135-38, since an objectively
reasonable basis for bad faith conduct might still be found. Id. at 138. Applying the Scott reasoning,
the officer's good faith in DeFillippo should have been disregarded, since the arrest might still have
been found objectively unreasonable under the Sibron test. Scott was not mentioned in DeFillippo.
Apparently the Court is willing to tolerate doctrinal inconsistencies in order to maximize law enforce-
ment objectives. Between DeFillippo and Scott the government receives a double advantage in sup-
pression hearings. DeFillippo permits the prosecutor to argue that no fourth amendment violation
occurred because the police acted in good faith. Scott precludes the defendant from asserting even
admitted bad faith on the part of the police to prove an abridgment of his fourth amendment rights.
116. See note 90 supra. Should the defendant succeed in negating a policeman's good faith
claim, he will be confronted by Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978), which deprives him the
benefit of a bad faith showing on the substantive issue. See note 115 supra.
Vol. 55:849, 1980
Search and Seizure
erally their broad reading of the civil good faith defense standard 17 into
fourth amendment content. If that occurs, strict probable cause in the
criminal setting would give way to the relaxed requirement that police act
in good faith, reasonably believing their conduct to be lawful. 118 Aware
of the complexities inherent in search and seizure doctrine, a court apply-
ing such a broad standard would be unlikely to find unreasonable an offi-
cer's claimed good faith belief that probable cause existed. "19 The touch-
stone for validity of police conduct would be the officer's virtually
irrefutable testimony that he believed his actions to be within the law.
V. CONCLUSION
It is regrettable that the Court was willing to gloss over longstanding
principles of search and seizure doctrine to achieve the desired end in
DeFillippo. Perhaps the outcome was not unexpected in light of recent
Burger Court decisions 20 revealing a thinly veiled bias based upon law
enforcement favoritism and exclusionary rule hostility. Yet the use of
good faith reliance to deny that a fourth amendment violation took place
was a needless encroachment on the substantive right. The Court should
not frivolously sacrifice constitutional protections when it has available
the equally effective and less fundamentally destructive alternative of
withholding the exclusionary remedy.
117. Pierson's civil defense of "good faith and probable cause," 386 U.S. at 57, has been
widely construed as requiring only that the police acted in good faith under the reasonable belief that
their conduct comported with the law. See, e.g., Reimer v. Short, 578 F.2d 621, 627 (5th Cir. 1978);
Boscarino v. Nelson, 518 F.2d 879, 881-82 (7th Cir. 1975); Brubaker v. King, 505 F.2d 534,
536-37 (7th Cir. 1974); Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368, 373 (4th Cir. 1974); Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339, 1348 (1972). Under this
liberal construction of Pierson, the focus of civil suits has shifted from reasonableness of police
conduct as a matter of law, to reasonableness of the officer's belief in the legality of his acts. The
probable cause component of the Pierson standard has simply been disregarded as surplusage. The
lower courts' treatment of Pierson has been the subject of considerable criticism by commentators.
See Thies, supra note 90, at 1000-26; Note, The Proposed Good Faith Test for Fourth Amendment
Exclusion Compared to the § 1983 Good Faith Defense: Problems and Prospects, 20 ARIZ. L. REV.
915, 939-41 (1978); Comment, Accountability for Government Misconduct: Limiting Qualified
Immunity and the Good Faith Defense, 49 TEMP. L. REv. 938, 945-63 (1976).
118. Seenote 117 supra.
119. The Chief Justice emphatically insists that "[p]olicemen do not have the time, inclination,
or training to read and grasp the nuances of the appellate opinions that ultimately define the standards
of conduct they are to follow." Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcot-
ics, 403 U.S. 388, 417 (1971)(Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
539-40 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
120. See, e.g., United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S.
128 (1978); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S.
457 (1978). But see, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47
(1979).
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Of most immediate concern to criminal defendants is lower court reac-
tion to DeFillippo. One hopes that trial judges and appellate courts will
respect the distinction between good faith in the civil and criminal con-
texts, decline to accept the Court's confused analogy to Pierson v. Ray,
and refrain from unnecessarily extending the DeFillippo analysis. An ap-
propriately measured response by the state and federal judiciary is essen-
tial to the preservation of resilient fourth amendment rights.
Even under the strictest reading of the case, however, the Court's artifi-
cial substantive-procedural distinction exposes fourth amendment safe-
guards to the practical pressure of local crime control needs. Personal
privacy and autonomy are threatened with further erosion unless legisla-
tures and city councils exercise self-restraint. Principled lawmakers must
forego the "transparent expedient" 121 of inventing flimsy substantive of-
fenses to facilitate the accomplishment of unconstitutional objectives.
Richard E. Gifford
121. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31,45 (1979)(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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